You can't fight drugs with guns
Published: 27 May 2007
The worldwide "war on drugs" that relies on armies and police to destroy crops and arrest traffickers has failed. The attempt to suppress the Latin American drugs trade at source, first decreed by Richard Nixon in the 1970s, has achieved nothing. Despite the spending of $25bn(£13bn) of US taxpayers' money, cocaine production in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia has increased, as has cocaine consumption in the US and the rest of the rich world.
As Hugh O'Shaughnessy argues today, the world is finally beginning to realise that you can't beat narcotics with machine guns and policemen's truncheons. As this newspaper reported last month, in parts of the world where the US is not the sole decider of the policy of the international community, more hopeful approaches are being tried. In Afghanistan, the British Government, responsible for security in the poppy-growing areas in the south, may be prepared to allow opium to be produced legally for medical purposes. If the price can be set at the right level, Afghan farmers would prefer the lower but more certain returns of growing a legal crop to those of an illegal one. It would bring a large sector of the Afghan economy within the law and make diversification and development more likely.
This is an increasingly urgent issue. As our sister newspaper, The Independent, reported last week, poppy-growing is spreading in the lawless badlands of Iraq. This reversal of the direction of causality from that found in Latin America, where illegal drug production leads to instability and lawlordism, only reinforces the argument against a punitive approach to tackling the sources of narcotics supply. Once illegal drug production is in the hands of gangsters it becomes difficult to prise open their grip.
Of course, the legalisation of part of the supply chain of narcotics is not an easy, cheap or complete answer to the psychological problems of drug dependence of a tiny minority of Westerners. But, accompanied by expensive programmes of education and treatment, it must be more successful than the policy of suppression that has so signally failed over the past 30 years.
lunes, 23 de julio de 2007
Learning to live in peace
Learning to live in peace
Anastasia Moloney
Guardian Weekly
The Hacienda Napoles was once the site of lavish parties, decadent living and million-dollar drug deals, a country estate where the infamous drug kingpin Pablo Escobar entertained mistresses, associates and members of Colombia's elite.
Today the violence that punctuated life here has been replaced with the hope of peace. Instead of cocaine, chilli peppers are set to dominate the local economy and provide jobs for scores of paramilitary fighters who have laid down their weapons. Fourteen years after Escobar was hunted down and shot, the government took over the 2,225-hectare estate in Puerto Triunfo, northern Colombia. The mayor recently handed over part of the estate for government-led agricultural reintegration projects.
Article continues
Rightwing paramilitary groups formed in the 1980s to protect businessmen and landowners from guerrilla attacks. They later evolved into death squads responsible for a large proportion of human rights abuses committed during decades of civil strife. Since 2003 more than 31,000 paramilitary fighters have demobilised under a deal between the government of Alvaro Uribe and militia bosses.
The government now faces the challenge of reintegrating former combatants, many of whom have little schooling, back into civilian life.
Raul Gallego, 23, spent five years fighting. Like many, he joined a paramilitary group because he needed the money. He demobilised last year and is grateful to have been given a job tending plants that will turned into chilli powder and sauce. "I never imagined that I would end up as a farmer," he says. "It's a great chance to have a proper job, provide for my son and spend more time with him."
Of the 120 families involved in the programme, about half are former paramilitary fighters, while the remainder includes single mothers and displaced families. At a public meeting hosted by the government a year ago, project leaders and families were selected to participate. Then followed three months of workshops to teach basic farming techniques.
It costs $3,500 a year to reintegrate a former combatant. This programme, funded by a mixture of private and public funding and international aid, is seen as a model for future initiatives. USAid and Cementos Argos, a Colombian cement company, each donated $1.3m. The EU has so far given about $100m to reintegration programmes.
Support from private business is crucial, says Frank Pearl, the presidential high commissioner for economic and social reintegration. "It's a chance for companies to practice social corporate responsibility." There are some 46 reintegration projects in the pipeline, funded in part by the private sector.
But serious obstacles remain. Host communities who have been traumatised by paramilitaries have entrenched prejudices and are reluctant to welcome disarmed fighters as neighbours. Mr Gallego says he feels "no resentment or hard feelings" from the local community and feels accepted. But his experience is unusual.
For Mr Pearl, it is an urgent issue requiring support from society. "We need to get people to stop thinking that this is simply a government problem."
Gaining the trust of demobilised fighters was one of the hardest challenges, says Fernando Calado, from the International Organisation for Migration, who spent a year helping set up the programme. "It's taken time to regain their confidence and trust in the system," he explains. Another problem is finding available land, as ownership in Colombia is concentrated in the hands of a few elite.
Literacy and skills training workshops are also being introduced. But the government admits about 3,800 demobilised fighters are not involved in any state projects. "We know who they are but we don't know what they do during the week," says Mr Pearl.
The greatest challenge is guaranteeing long-term employment. "The reinsertion programme has had serious shortcomings. As paramilitaries leave the programme without jobs, the risk of relapse into criminal activities increases," says a recent report from the International Crisis Group.
It estimates that at least 3,000 people, including former combatants, have joined new illegal armed groups in recent years. Criminal groups are reportedly offering former combatants up to 700,000 pesos a month ($360), about double the monthly minimum wage.
Back at Hacienda Napoles, tractors rake the fertile soil in preparation for the rows of chilli peppers that will be harvested throughout the year. Many futures depend on this ambitious project.
Mr Pearl says: "Our ultimate aim is to make people feel it was worth leaving behind their arms and that communities can live in peace."
Anastasia Moloney
Guardian Weekly
The Hacienda Napoles was once the site of lavish parties, decadent living and million-dollar drug deals, a country estate where the infamous drug kingpin Pablo Escobar entertained mistresses, associates and members of Colombia's elite.
Today the violence that punctuated life here has been replaced with the hope of peace. Instead of cocaine, chilli peppers are set to dominate the local economy and provide jobs for scores of paramilitary fighters who have laid down their weapons. Fourteen years after Escobar was hunted down and shot, the government took over the 2,225-hectare estate in Puerto Triunfo, northern Colombia. The mayor recently handed over part of the estate for government-led agricultural reintegration projects.
Article continues
Rightwing paramilitary groups formed in the 1980s to protect businessmen and landowners from guerrilla attacks. They later evolved into death squads responsible for a large proportion of human rights abuses committed during decades of civil strife. Since 2003 more than 31,000 paramilitary fighters have demobilised under a deal between the government of Alvaro Uribe and militia bosses.
The government now faces the challenge of reintegrating former combatants, many of whom have little schooling, back into civilian life.
Raul Gallego, 23, spent five years fighting. Like many, he joined a paramilitary group because he needed the money. He demobilised last year and is grateful to have been given a job tending plants that will turned into chilli powder and sauce. "I never imagined that I would end up as a farmer," he says. "It's a great chance to have a proper job, provide for my son and spend more time with him."
Of the 120 families involved in the programme, about half are former paramilitary fighters, while the remainder includes single mothers and displaced families. At a public meeting hosted by the government a year ago, project leaders and families were selected to participate. Then followed three months of workshops to teach basic farming techniques.
It costs $3,500 a year to reintegrate a former combatant. This programme, funded by a mixture of private and public funding and international aid, is seen as a model for future initiatives. USAid and Cementos Argos, a Colombian cement company, each donated $1.3m. The EU has so far given about $100m to reintegration programmes.
Support from private business is crucial, says Frank Pearl, the presidential high commissioner for economic and social reintegration. "It's a chance for companies to practice social corporate responsibility." There are some 46 reintegration projects in the pipeline, funded in part by the private sector.
But serious obstacles remain. Host communities who have been traumatised by paramilitaries have entrenched prejudices and are reluctant to welcome disarmed fighters as neighbours. Mr Gallego says he feels "no resentment or hard feelings" from the local community and feels accepted. But his experience is unusual.
For Mr Pearl, it is an urgent issue requiring support from society. "We need to get people to stop thinking that this is simply a government problem."
Gaining the trust of demobilised fighters was one of the hardest challenges, says Fernando Calado, from the International Organisation for Migration, who spent a year helping set up the programme. "It's taken time to regain their confidence and trust in the system," he explains. Another problem is finding available land, as ownership in Colombia is concentrated in the hands of a few elite.
Literacy and skills training workshops are also being introduced. But the government admits about 3,800 demobilised fighters are not involved in any state projects. "We know who they are but we don't know what they do during the week," says Mr Pearl.
The greatest challenge is guaranteeing long-term employment. "The reinsertion programme has had serious shortcomings. As paramilitaries leave the programme without jobs, the risk of relapse into criminal activities increases," says a recent report from the International Crisis Group.
It estimates that at least 3,000 people, including former combatants, have joined new illegal armed groups in recent years. Criminal groups are reportedly offering former combatants up to 700,000 pesos a month ($360), about double the monthly minimum wage.
Back at Hacienda Napoles, tractors rake the fertile soil in preparation for the rows of chilli peppers that will be harvested throughout the year. Many futures depend on this ambitious project.
Mr Pearl says: "Our ultimate aim is to make people feel it was worth leaving behind their arms and that communities can live in peace."
US mining group faces trial over dead activists
By Anastasia Moloney in Bogotá
Published: July 8 2007 18:54 | Last updated: July 8 2007 18:54
A landmark trial involving a US mining company accused of conspiring to murder three Colombian union activists opens on Monday in a US district court in Birmingham, Alabama.
The civil lawsuit, filed by the International Labor Rights Fund and the United Steelworkers of America, accuses Drummond, an Alabama-based mining company, of paying paramilitaries to kill union leaders who worked at the company’s La Loma coal mine in northern Colombia in 2001.
“The case seeks to remedy and prevent the violent persecution of trade unionists working at the Drummond facilities in Colombia,” states the complaint.
According to the plaintiffs, two union leaders, Valmore Lacarno and Victor Orcasita, were hauled off a company bus by paramilitary gunmen hired by Drummond. Lacarno was shot in the head several times in front of other workers and the corpse of his colleague was later found on the roadside.
Both had been involved in contract disputes with Drummond for about a year before their murder. Seven months later, Gustavo Soler, the president of Sintramienergética, the Colombian mining union, was also killed.
The union leaders “were ultimately murdered by paramilitary employees and or agents working for the defendants [Drummond] to eliminate effective leaders of the trade union representing Drummond workers, and to intimidate other workers from joining the union or assuming a union leadership position,” the complaint alleges.
The plaintiffs, who represent the families of the murdered union leaders, also claim that Drummond provided local militias with fuel, food and transport.
Plaintiff lawyers have collected affidavits from witnesses who used to work at the Drummond mine, including a US Vietnam-war veteran, a mine supervisor and a Colombian army sergeant.
Last week the US Court of Appeal ruled that sworn testimonies from several key witnesses central to the plaintiffs’ case would not be permitted in court because they were submitted too late.
However, Dan Kovalik, a United Steelworkers lawyer representing the victims’ families, remains “optimistic” that the court will award compensation payments to the families. “We have other witnesses, we’ve got a good case,” he said.
Drummond, a leading foreign investor in Colombia, has denied the accusations.
“The allegations are completely without merit and have no basis in facts. We look forward to proving our innocence in the court of law,” it said. When asked for further comment, the company said it could not comment “on the specifics of the case”.
The allegations come at a time when the Colombian government is embroiled in a scandal that links militias with the country’s politicians.
The case has attracted attention from US Democrats, who have refused to approve a proposed bilateral trade deal, citing concerns over the murder of union activists and alleged links between the Colombian army and paramilitaries.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
Published: July 8 2007 18:54 | Last updated: July 8 2007 18:54
A landmark trial involving a US mining company accused of conspiring to murder three Colombian union activists opens on Monday in a US district court in Birmingham, Alabama.
The civil lawsuit, filed by the International Labor Rights Fund and the United Steelworkers of America, accuses Drummond, an Alabama-based mining company, of paying paramilitaries to kill union leaders who worked at the company’s La Loma coal mine in northern Colombia in 2001.
“The case seeks to remedy and prevent the violent persecution of trade unionists working at the Drummond facilities in Colombia,” states the complaint.
According to the plaintiffs, two union leaders, Valmore Lacarno and Victor Orcasita, were hauled off a company bus by paramilitary gunmen hired by Drummond. Lacarno was shot in the head several times in front of other workers and the corpse of his colleague was later found on the roadside.
Both had been involved in contract disputes with Drummond for about a year before their murder. Seven months later, Gustavo Soler, the president of Sintramienergética, the Colombian mining union, was also killed.
The union leaders “were ultimately murdered by paramilitary employees and or agents working for the defendants [Drummond] to eliminate effective leaders of the trade union representing Drummond workers, and to intimidate other workers from joining the union or assuming a union leadership position,” the complaint alleges.
The plaintiffs, who represent the families of the murdered union leaders, also claim that Drummond provided local militias with fuel, food and transport.
Plaintiff lawyers have collected affidavits from witnesses who used to work at the Drummond mine, including a US Vietnam-war veteran, a mine supervisor and a Colombian army sergeant.
Last week the US Court of Appeal ruled that sworn testimonies from several key witnesses central to the plaintiffs’ case would not be permitted in court because they were submitted too late.
However, Dan Kovalik, a United Steelworkers lawyer representing the victims’ families, remains “optimistic” that the court will award compensation payments to the families. “We have other witnesses, we’ve got a good case,” he said.
Drummond, a leading foreign investor in Colombia, has denied the accusations.
“The allegations are completely without merit and have no basis in facts. We look forward to proving our innocence in the court of law,” it said. When asked for further comment, the company said it could not comment “on the specifics of the case”.
The allegations come at a time when the Colombian government is embroiled in a scandal that links militias with the country’s politicians.
The case has attracted attention from US Democrats, who have refused to approve a proposed bilateral trade deal, citing concerns over the murder of union activists and alleged links between the Colombian army and paramilitaries.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
domingo, 22 de julio de 2007
Comercio internacional y sentido común.
"Un artículo que deberían leer todos los apóstoles del Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos. Hasta dónde estamos dispuestos a torcer la espina dorsal por unos pocos pesos? Desafortunadamente el deporte nacional de mirarnos el ombligo es enemigo del sentido común que explica por qué la realidad económica es una sóla. La venta de obleas y arequipe no puede ser la vía al desarrollo."
Matemáticas elementales para el TLC
Matemáticas elementales para el TLC
Aurelio Suárez Montoya
Está por cerrarse la capitulación de Colombia ante Estados Unidos en el TLC, avisada para la ronda duodécima de negociación que se inicia esta semana en Cartagena. El interés de “terminar cuanto antes” zanjará las “diferencias” mediante la subordinación política. Para justificar tan reprobable conducta, el ministro Botero anunció que “no respetará pinta” y pregonó que Colombia alcanzará “acceso al mercado más grande del mundo”. Pretende validar así la alteración institucional que conlleva el TLC en perjuicio de las mayorías, incluida la relegación de sus derechos fundamentales por la concesión de gangas a capitales y mercancías estadounidenses.
Un ejercicio matemático, salido de las cuentas del comercio exterior de Estados Unidos, permite dilucidar si el pregonado éxito para las exportaciones colombianas es realidad o quimera. Según el Banco Mundial, el ingreso total de los 293.5 millones de norteamericanos, de 41.400 dólares anuales por cabeza, llegó en 2004 a 11,7 billones (con doce ceros). Algunos estiman que esa cifra colosal, la tercera parte del ingreso mundial, es la suma que Estados Unidos piensa gastar comprando productos de Colombia. La primera noticia al respecto es que de ella apenas dedica menos de 8 dólares de cada 100, 1,48 billones, para adquirir mercancías extranjeras, el grueso se consagra a comprar artículos producidos en los mismos Estados Unidos. No obstante, por su crisis energética, el Imperio gastó en 2004 casi 207.000 millones en combustibles minerales, de ellos Colombia alcanzó a proveer sólo cerca del 1,8%.
Con el 1,2 billón de dólares restante, Estados Unidos importó automóviles, y autopartes por 230.000 millones, Colombia no vendió un dólar. Las compras externas norteamericanas de bienes de capital, computadores y accesorios, maquinaria industrial, equipo de telecomunicaciones, médico, aeronáutico y para manejo de materiales, semiconductores e instrumentos de medición, entre otros, coparon 350.000 millones en 2004. Se sabe que Colombia, de eso, tampoco suministró nada.
Descontando los reglones descritos, en los que el país no tiene asomo, quedan 600.000 millones como saldo disponible para la colocación de productos nacionales. De dicha cantidad, descontando lo ya nombrado en energéticos, se consumen otros 200.000 millones de dólares en materias primas y materiales extranjeros para la industria. Sobresale el gasto de cerca de 100.000 millones en químicos, cosméticos, orgánicos, inorgánicos, médicos y plásticos; Colombia de tal universo facturó sólo 130 millones, 0,13% del total. Las otras materias primas son aluminio, cobre, zinc, caucho, lana, seda, algodón, materiales nucleares, papel, madera, bauxita, vidrio, minerales no metálicos, níquel, cemento y oro. De éstas últimas, Colombia vendió 600 millones (488 en oro) para ser escasamente el 0,73% del total del rubro de insumos.
De los algo más de 400.000 millones restantes, Estados Unidos compró 370.000 en bienes de consumo. Con excepción de vestuario y textiles, algo de cuero y algunas manufacturas metálicas, Colombia no produce nada de lo que cubre el gasto mayor de importaciones de consumidores finales en Estados Unidos: farmacéuticos, televisores, electrodomésticos, diamantes, joyería, bienes para hogar y cocina, alfombras, motocicletas, artículos deportivos, juegos y juguetes, equipo de fotografía e instrumentos musicales. De los bienes finales, Colombia es tan sólo 654 millones de dólares, el 0,18%. Finalmente, en el ramo de alimentos, bebidas y piensos, de 60.000 millones de dólares que se demandan de géneros foráneos en Estados Unidos, el café, con 350 millones, el banano, con 150, el azúcar, galletas y confites, con 60, los camarones, con 29, y los cigarrillos con 60, suman una participación colombiana de 650 millones, el 1,1%. Lo peor es que en renglones donde los turiferarios del TLC hablan de “intereses ofensivos”, como en tabaco o lácteos, Estados Unidos compra afuera cantidades que apenas superan 1.000 millones de dólares al año, algo irrisorio.
A parte de ciertas variedades de flores, Colombia no produce nada de importancia de lo que demanda el mercado de Estados Unidos; quienes sí lo hacen no han requerido firmar un TLC, es el caso de 26 de los 30 principales proveedores. Las cuentas anteriores muestran que por el sacrificio de muchos, con bajos salarios, desplazamiento y desempleo en el TLC, únicamente se recibirán unas cuantas monedas cuyos destinatarios serán los mismos de siempre. ¿Será que el ministro Botero, que califica como amañados los argumentos y procedimientos de los opositores al TLC tampoco creerá a las matemáticas elementales que lo desnudan y lo dejan sin “hoja de parra”?
El Canto del Verdugo
"El Incendiario abre el debate sobre como se esta gestionando el mal llamado proceso de los paras....por qué Uribe de un lado anuncia por un lado la liberacion unilateral de guerrilleros de la FARC y del otro aplica a los paras y sus senadores una amnistia absurda? Donde queda la legitimidad del sistema judicial Colombiano? Es este el ultimo paso en falso de un presidente acorralado?"
EL AÑO DE LA VERDAD
EL AÑO DE LA VERDAD
Medellín se quedó sin saber la verdad del pasado y del presente
Tras las audiencias en versión libre del jefe paramiltar Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, alias ‘Don Berna’ o ‘Adolfo Paz’, queda una sensación de frustración. Uno de los mayores criminales de la violenta historia de Colombia se quejó porque no era reconocido como “hombre de paz”. Análisis.
Por Juan Diego Restrepo E. (*)
Fecha: 07/18/2007 - Negar todo vínculo con acciones militares ilegales que degeneraron en crímenes de lesa humanidad, atribuirles esos hechos a sus oponentes en armas y aclarar que en varias incursiones cayeron sólo actores del conflicto y no víctimas inocentes, fue la tendencia de alias ‘Don Berna’ ante la fiscal de la Unidad de Justicia y Paz que lo recibió en audiencia.
Contrario a toda evidencia, incluso judicial, el jefe de los bloques Cacique Nutibara, Héroes de Granada y Héroes de Tolová, persistió en diluir parte de sus responsabilidades en el comandante paramilitar Carlos Castaño Gil, asesinado por paramilitares en 2004, y algunos hechos cruentos a aquellos grupos que combatió, entre ellos al bloque Metro de las Autodefensas y a las milicias de la subversión.
Fue tanta su imprecisión, que el publicitado “gesto humanitario” de entregar las coordenadas del sitio donde reposaban los restos de cuatro familiares y un amigo de María Elena Toro, líder de la Corporación Madres de la Candelaria –Línea Fundadora–, asesinados por las Auc en 1997, no condujo a nada. Hasta el momento, los cuerpos no han sido hallados y su errónea información condujo a que se postergaran los restantes dos días de audiencia que le quedaban a alias ‘Don Berna’, con la excusa de buscar más información para lograr tal propósito.
Durante lunes y martes, las madres de la Corporación Madres de la Candelaria –Línea Fundadora–, el Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado y la Campaña Memorias contra el silencio y la impunidad exigieron la verdad, nada más que la verdad, sobre las acciones de los bloques paramilitares Cacique Nutibara y Héroes de Granada, que operaron entre 1998 y 2005. Fue un reclamo profundo y legítimo de madres y padres, esposas y esposos, y hermanas y hermanos de aquellos que fueron desaparecidos por las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).
Y si bien no hubo verdades de fondo, las víctimas alcanzaron un logro: evitar manifestaciones masivas a favor de alias ‘Don Berna’, tal como lo habían preparado con anticipación los reinsertados de las AUC, para lo cual habían presionado a las instituciones educativas de la ciudad con el fin de enviar grupos de estudiantes a recibirlo festivamente. No hubo flores, no hubo papel picado. Hubo indignación y un solo grito: “¡asesino!, ¡asesino!, ¡asesino!”.
En el vacío quedó la verdad sobre las personas desaparecidas en Medellín atribuibles al accionar de los bloques de las AUC comandados por alias ‘Don Berna’; en el aire también quedó la ubicación de varias fosas de la comuna 13 en donde reposan los restos, muchos de ellos descuartizados, de hombres y mujeres secuestrados, desaparecidos y asesinados semanas después de ejecutada la Operación Orión, en octubre de 2003, a través de la cual el Estado retomó el control de esa zona de la ciudad.
Pero otra verdad sobre el accionar paramilitar que quedó sin ser revelada, por lo menos en estos dos primeros días de audiencia, no está relacionada con el pasado, sino con el presente. De acuerdo con evidencias recogidas por diversas organizaciones defensoras de derechos humanos, el paramilitarismo aún está en los barrios de Medellín. Y las claves de ello las tiene alias ‘Don Berna’, quien al respecto, y pese a las evidencias, negó tener cualquier vínculo.
Pero las respuestas no sólo se le deben pedir al jefe paramilitar. El alcalde, Sergio Fajardo, y el secretario de Gobierno, Gustavo Villegas, también tendrán algo que explicar y responder si la ciudad está bajo control del paramilitarismo o en manos de la fuerza pública y del Estado social de derecho.
Reveladoras resultan las apreciaciones de los habitantes de la comuna 13 por ejemplo, quienes en voz baja y a través de sus líderes aseveran que allí “la situación está muy pesada, muy tensionante”. En los barrios de este sector de la ciudad confluyen, según sus pobladores, la fuerza pública y el “paramilitarismo”.
Y resulta preocupante lo ocurrido en el barrio Villa de Guadalupe, donde varios jóvenes pretendían impedir una obra teatral preparada por integrantes de la Campaña Memorias contra el silencio y la impunidad. “Vayánse ligerito que no respondemos por su seguridad” fueron las palabras amenazantes. ¿Quiénes son estos muchachos y quién los apoya en sus labores de control? Nadie lo sabe, y si alguien lo sabe, no se atreve a hablar.
Pero lo valioso de ese hecho, que no pasó a mayores, es que pese a lo reiterado por la Alcaldía de Medellín, en la ciudad que hoy se vende al mundo sí hay territorios vedados para sus propios ciudadanos. La evidencia es indiscutible. Y queda claro entonces que en Medellín existen dos verdades por contar: la del pasado y la del presente.
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