Colombia learns from strife
Armored vehicles and security expertise gained in its civil war are in demand abroad, especially in Iraq.
By Chris Kraul, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
July 31, 2007

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA --
Security is big business in Colombia, where a four-decade civil war has spawned a cottage industry of manufacturers and service firms whose mission is to keep their clients alive.

Firms such as armored car manufacturer Blindex and armored clothing maker Miguel Caballero, both based in Bogota, have even earned international renown. With security improving since President Alvaro Uribe took office in 2002 -- murders and kidnappings are down -- demand has been declining at home. But export sales are making up the difference. And the U.S. government is a big client.

Security in Colombia has become a $100-million industry, with exports accounting for about half of all revenue, according to the superintendent for Vigilance and Private Security, which regulates the industry.

The industry's growth rate is about 10% annually, according to government statistics, with armored cars and clothing among the fastest-growing segments, said Superintendent Felipe Munoz. Security consulting by Colombians is also on the rise.

Blindex "up-armors" 350 Toyotas and other sport utility vehicles each year, selling the majority of them to the U.S. for use by soldiers and government employees in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although most of its sales five years ago were to Colombian clients worried about kidnapping, robberies or murder, the company now ships 70% of its cars -- which cost as much as $140,000 each -- overseas.

"Luck always plays a role, and once the Iraq war began, the U.S. government was quickly overwhelmed by the demand for products like ours," Blindex Vice President Laurent Fossaert said. "The Americans found us, we weren't looking for them."

Fossaert's company is one of only four firms worldwide whose up-armoring work is accepted by the U.S. departments of State and Defense. U.S. government security experts pay regular visits to Blindex factories in Bogota and Barranquilla to review requirements in the face of ever-changing security threats.

Blindex says the key to the durability of its automobiles is not the materials, which include high-quality steel, but the design, perfected over nearly three decades of trial and error in Colombia's high-risk environment.

"Colombia is our laboratory," Fossaert said. "The trick is to build a car that is totally secure but not so heavy that it won't still move fast if necessary. You can build a car impervious to blasts but so ponderous that it won't brake."

Iraq and Afghanistan, however, are posing enormous challenges as insurgents' weapons become increasingly lethal, he said.

Blindex cars have proved capable of withstanding blasts from improvised explosive devices, the leading cause of death of soldiers and government workers in Iraq. Passengers have survived bombs made with as many as four pounds of plastic explosives and with 105mm and 155mm mortar shells.

But Fossaert acknowledges that the company is at a loss to up-armor against the newest IEDs, which incorporate so-called explosively formed devices. These are made with a copper shell that, upon explosion, becomes a high-speed, molten copper projectile that can penetrate even tanks.

Fossaert said that "armies from various countries" have asked his firm to make military vehicles, a request that Blindex has so far refused on philosophical grounds.

"It's nice to know our vehicles save lives. It would not be so agreeable to know that, as offensive weapons, they helped kill people," Fossaert said.

Mayhem also has been good for armor maker Caballero, which manufactures a broad line of military, police and civilian clothing that can withstand shrapnel and large-caliber bullets. The company's clients include Prince Felipe of Spain, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, King Abdullah II of Jordan and Hollywood star Steven Seagal.

Caballero uses a patented weave of nylon and polyester to make fabrics that can stop a .38 caliber bullet, said Miguel Caballero, 39, founder and president of the 300-employee firm. His showroom features products including bulletproof vests, minesweepers' gear and armored ties and shirts that look perfectly normal. A big seller is an armored version of the tropical shirt called the guayabera that Mexican President Felipe Calderon recently ordered.

"Products such as these," said Caballero, "could only develop here because of what we have been through in this country for 40 years."

Colombian paramilitary warlords vow to rejoin peace process, resume confessions

The Associated Press

Sunday, July 29, 2007

Sunday's reversal came six days after leaders of the paramilitary umbrella group known as the AUC, from its initials in Spanish, halted testimonies in protest of a Supreme Court ruling disavowing the 2003 peace pact that led 31,000 right-wing irregulars to disarm.

AUC spokesman Antonio Lopez said from the western city of Medellin that the paramilitaries will rejoin the process to demonstrate their "unflinching commitment" to the country.

On July 11, the Supreme Court ruled the AUC was a criminal — not a political — organization and right-wing fighters were not entitled to amnesty.

President Alvaro Uribe scrambled to woo back the paramilitaries, accusing the high court of having an "ideological slant" — a move interpreted by political observers as a dangerous encroachment on the independence of the judicial branch.

Circumventing the ruling, he introduced legislation that would grant paramilitaries the legal status of subversives, putting them on the same playing field as leftist rebels who have been battling to topple the state for almost a half-century.

"Looking at a cadaver that has been tortured and mutilated, I don't understand what difference it makes to say the assassin was a guerrilla or a paramilitary," Uribe said Friday. "The impact on the victim, a family and society is the same."

The proposed legislation angered the militias' victims, who say the government is being too lenient toward fighters accused of some of the conflict's worst atrocities: hundreds of massacres, widespread extortion and the theft of millions of acres (hectares) of land.

Under the Justice and Peace law governing the peace process, paramilitaries must confess their crimes and hand over illegally obtained assets to compensate the 70,000 victims who have so far come forward with reparation claims. In exchange, they are entitled to maximum jail sentences of eight years and protection from extradition to the United States.

But the warlords have surrendered only a sliver of their vast fortunes and confessed to only a few crimes — most of which have already been well-documented by prosecutors.

Created in the 1980s by wealthy ranchers to combat the rebels, the paramilitary groups later took a leading role in Colombia's lucrative drug trade while evolving into mafias that corrupted politics at the highest levels.

A number of paramilitary leaders have been indicted for drug trafficking by U.S. courts, and the U.S. State Department declared the AUC a foreign terrorist organization in 2001. To date, Uribe has suspended five extradition orders approved by Colombia's Supreme Court.

---

General colombiano ve ''difícil'' mejorar imagen de su país

NESTOR IKEDA / AP

WASHINGTON

Los esfuerzos de Colombia para mejorar su imagen en Washington seguirán siendo ''muy difíciles'' mientras la Casa Blanca y el Congreso estén controlados por diferentes partidos, declaró un militar retirado que fuera estratega clave del presidente Alvaro Uribe.

''Hay un problema de percepción'', dijo el general Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, quien comandó las fuerzas militares colombianas entre el 2004 y el 2006.

''La percepción de la imagen de Colombia en Estados Unidos se asocia con la propia política interna estadounidense'', agregó Ospina en una entrevista con AP el fin de semana. Agregó, sin embargo, que es necesario mantener los esfuerzos para mejorar la imagen de su país. ''El lobby es importante'', dijo. ``Ahora, de ser difícil [la gestión], yo lo veo muy difícil precisamente por esa percepción''.

''Como el presidente Bush tiene una posición, el partido contrario, el Demócrata, tiene que tener una posición contraria a la del presidente'', dijo.

Uribe tiene un prioritario interés en mejorar la imagen de su gobierno y Colombia ante el Congreso en Washington para sacar adelante el tratado de libre comercio y la segunda etapa del Plan Colombia de lucha contra las drogas y grupos armados.

El gobierno del presidente George W. Bush y los republicanos respaldan a Uribe. Los demócratas, que ahora controlan ambas legislativas, han exigido a Uribe como condición para el tratado ''pruebas concretas'' sobre un avance en los derechos humanos, el control de la violencia --especialmente contra sindicalistas--, y la pacificación del país.

Ospina, profesor desde hace medio año en el Centro de Estudios de Defensa Hemisférica de la Universidad Nacional de la Defensa en Washington, afirma sin embargo que la situación en el país ha mejorado.

''Definitivamente'', dijo. ``Eso no quiere decir que se haya sobrepuesto a los problemas; quiere decir simplemente que está mejorando y tiene que mejorar mucho todavía''.

Declaró que el caso de los sindicalistas asesinados estaba siendo tratado por las autoridades y han disminuido en número, los crímenes de los paramilitares están siendo esclarecidos, y que el gobierno está en diálogo para una desmovilización de todos los grupos armados.

''Se dice que el problema colombiano lleva ya 40 años, lo cual es relativamente cierto'', declaró. ``Pero la intención del gobierno de terminar con ese problema es relativamente corta, de cinco años''.

Recordó que en 1998, la Agencia de Inteligencia de la Defensa dijo que las fuerzas armadas colombianas ``serían derrotadas en cinco años a menos que el gobierno recupere su legitimidad política y las fuerzas armadas sean drásticamente reestructuradas''.

Desde esa época, los colombianos no sólo no han visto la derrota de su aparato militar sino ``han visto un cambio de situación, una reestructuración, un cambio de vida''.

Ospina dijo que no podía ser tajante como el vicealmirante Guillermo Barrera Hurtado, actual jefe de la Marina colombiana, cuando en noviembre del 2005 afirmó que la lucha contra el

Colombia admits high-level military corruption

By Hugh Bronstein

Reuters
Monday, July 30, 2007; 3:50 PM

BOGOTA (Reuters) - Cocaine smugglers and leftist rebels have infiltrated senior levels of the Colombian army, impeding efforts at defeating the guerrillas and fighting drugs, Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos said on Monday.

Colombia's largest rebel force and the country's main cocaine cartel have bribed officials "at a high level" into sharing information that has helped bosses of both illegal groups avoid capture, Santos told reporters.

Colombia remains the world's biggest exporter of cocaine despite billions of dollars in mostly military aid from Washington aimed at stamping out the trade.

"Unfortunately, the infiltration has impeded us from capturing some of the big fish we had been investigating," Santos said.

Some military officials have been captured in the case and more arrests were expected, he said.

Earlier this month, the army discovered classified military information in computer files of guerrillas from the FARC rebel group who died in combat with state security forces. The information could only have come from a mole placed highly in the military hierarchy, officials say.

Also implicated in the scandal is Diego Montoya, head of the Norte del Valle cartel. Featured on the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted" list, Montoya is accused of exporting hundreds of tonnes of cocaine to the United States.

Investigators say he recruited army officers to provide him with protection and help plan the breakout of his brother, Eugenio Montoya, who has been in a high-security prison since the start of the year.

This Andean country is regularly jolted by revelations involving its multibillion-dollar cocaine trade.

Last year, 10 anti-narcotics police were gunned down by Colombian soldiers in the pay of drug traffickers near the western town of Jamundi, prosecutors charge.

President Alvaro Uribe's international standing has been damaged by investigations showing some of his closest allies in Congress were in the pay of drug-running paramilitary militias formed in the 1980s to help rich Colombians fight the rebels.

He remains popular at home for reducing urban crime and sparking economic growth with his tough security policies.

Colombia's spy chief: 11 lawmaker hostages killed by rebels during friendly-fire incident

The Associated Press

Saturday, July 28, 2007

BOGOTA, Colombia: A confused clash between two bands of rebels led a commander to order the death of 11 hostage lawmakers last month, the head of Colombia's intelligence agency said Saturday.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, announced in late June that the state legislators had died in the crossfire when an "unidentified military group" attacked the camp where they were being held.

Andres Penate, the head of the DAS intelligence agency, told a Bogota press conference that rebels from the FARC's 60th Front killed the hostages when they spotted another band of insurgents and mistook them for a nearby army unit.

There was no immediate response from the FARC and no way to reach its officials.

Penate said testimony from deserting guerrillas and intercepted radio communications showed that the 60th Front commander, known as "El Grillo," ordered the lawmakers killed during the clash with the 29th Front between June 10 and 16 in the southern state of Narino.

Penate presented a transcript of a radio conversation in which an unidentified guerrilla apparently asks about the sole hostage lawmaker who was not killed in the incident.

President Alvaro Uribe has accused the rebels of murdering the captives in cold blood and challenged the FARC to give the bodies to an international commission led by the Red Cross so that forensic experts can determine how they died.

The FARC has issued statements from the jungle offering to hand over the bodies, but it has not yet done so.

"It's saddening there are so many rumors floating around," said Fabiola Perdomo, the widow of a slain congressman. "All we want is the truth."

Penate said the same radio communications indicate that the FARC is trying to move the bodies before a handover to make it seem that they were in an area the rebels demand be made a demilitarized zone for talks with the government over a swap for another 50 hostages, including three American defense contractors.

"They're trying to deceive the public, pretending that the hostages were located in the proposed safe haven so they can blame the government for their deaths," Penate said.

"These FARC bandits know that the longer they delay handing over the cadavers, the more difficult it will be for forensic experts to determine how they were killed," Uribe said Saturday. "Fools! Assassins! Liars! Now they want to consummate the lie."

The 12 lawmakers were kidnapped in April 2002 in the southwest city of Cali, in a daylight raid on the state legislature by rebels dressed as soldiers.

La prepotencia de los matones

Que un presidente, en una disputa entre la Corte y los delincuentes, tome partido por estos últimos, es una vergüenza.

Por Héctor Abad Faciolince
Fecha: 07/28/2007 -1317

Cada vez que los guerrilleros cometen alguna barbaridad, el Presidente les muestra los colmillos y gruñe, iracundo, y le ordena al Ejército combatir a esos bandidos con todo el peso del aparato militar. Me parece bien. Lo que me parece mal es que cada vez que los paramilitares cometen un nuevo acto de indudable arrogancia, una bravuconada

prepotente, y nos chantajean con la amenaza de volver a su negocio de muerte, el presidente lo que pela es los dientes en una sonrisa y les ofrece otra ley para calmarlos y seguir rebajándoles las penas cada vez más y más, hasta que estas se conviertan en un parpadeo de prisión. ¿No les bastan a los matones condenas de ocho años por sus matanzas sin número, ocho años que serán cuatro y en los cuales les contarán sus meses de finca por cárcel? No, no les bastan; también quieren ser políticos, y que la sociedad los vea como héroes, como "hombres de paz", no como traficantes de drogas y de muerte sino como alzados en armas contra la iniquidad.

Los paramilitares hacen alarde de su poder, que permanece intacto en muchas regiones, y amedrentan a los civiles y al Estado con sus amenazas, pues hasta Uribe (que debería representar la dignidad del país, el poder de las instituciones), como un conejo asustado, se pone de su parte, y anuncia nuevas leyes para calmarlos. Eso significa que la prepotencia y la arrogancia de los sanguinarios siguen teniendo más peso que la autoridad de un gobierno débil, y más fuerza que la cobardía de una sociedad civil que no ha sido capaz de salir a marchar también contra los peores asesinos que ha habido en la historia de este país: los paramilitares. Que un Presidente, en una disputa entre la Corte y los delincuentes, tome partido por estos últimos, es una vergüenza que debería hacernos temblar de indignación.

Siempre se ha dicho, y hay algo de verdad en esto, que los paramilitares surgieron como una respuesta a la incapacidad del Estado para defendernos de las barbaridades de la guerrilla. Lo que no se ha dicho, y también es verdad, es que la degradación de la lucha guerrillera, el hecho de que unos campesinos con algunos ideales de justicia social se hubieran convertido en secuestradores sin hígados, en narcotraficantes y criminales sin un proyecto político, es también una respuesta al salvajismo con que los paramilitares los combatieron: arrasando pueblos, masacrando las poblaciones con las que la guerrilla tenía contacto, persiguiendo y matando a familiares que no estaban en la guerra.

Y otra cosa no se ha dicho. Es verdad que el gobierno de la Seguridad Democrática puede mostrar unas cifras que hablan bien de su gestión: en los últimos años es indudable que los homicidios han disminuido de una manera neta en Colombia. Esto es muy satisfactorio. Pero también significa una cosa clara, al coincidir con las desmovilizaciones paramilitares y con su orden de dejar de matar: los que más mataban en este país eran ellos. Si han disminuido las muertes violentas, y es verdad, es porque los más matones no están matando tanto, al menos de momento, aunque cada rato anuncian que están dispuestos a volver, y los peores de ellos ya volvieron a la clandestinidad, y se dedican a su misma rutina sanguinaria. Lo terrible es que en esta coyuntura el gobierno, en vez de apoyar a nuestra justicia, dice que debe "dialogar" con la Corte. Las Cortes no están para dialogar o negociar con el Ejecutivo sus sentencias, las Cortes imparten justicia. Y todos los ciudadanos debemos acatar sus decisiones, empezando por el Presidente de la República.

En una rueda de prensa con micrófonos, mesa, mantel, corbatas y camisas nuevas (¿no están en una cárcel? parecen en un hotel), los paramilitares anuncian que no volverán donde los jueces. Y lo más ridículo: advierten que no seguirán revelando "los lugares donde están las fosas comunes de las víctimas" hasta que se les reconozca su estatus político. Admiten implícitamente un delito atroz, fosas comunes, y al mismo tiempo se presentan como idealistas que luchan por la paz. Pero eso no es lo peor. Lo peor es que el Presidente les dé la razón, en vez de encabezar una marcha también contra ellos.

Es verdad, las Farc han sembrado de secuestros y de sangre este país. Hay que marchar contra ellos y ya se ha hecho. Pero los paramilitares no han matado menos, han matado más. Entonces también contra ellos tendríamos que marchar. Si el gobierno se inclina ante los paramilitares, entonces no tenemos Estado, sino un centauro, un animal bifronte, mitad perro que le gruñe a la guerrilla y mitad conejo que les sonríe a los paramilitares. Con un gobierno alzado con los unos e inclinado a los otros nunca podremos avanzar. Nuestra única opción para salir del espanto que es este país es marchar, al mismo tiempo, contra el terror guerrillero y contra el horror paramilitar.

Salvatore Mancuso, former Colombian death squad leader, recounts squad's mayhem

By Indira A.R. Lakshmanan The Boston Globe
Published: January 18, 2007

A former chief of Colombia's rightist death squads testified in court this week about his role and the involvement of military and public officials in scores of massacres and assassinations of perceived political opponents.

The testimony by the chief, Salvatore Mancuso, in the northwestern city of Medellín is a key step toward clarifying and assigning blame for atrocities committed during Colombia's long civil war.

In two days, Mancuso, 48, detailed collusion by army generals, police colonels, a state prosecutor and politicians in planning the murders of scores of alleged leftists, local politicians and peasant organizers, according to lawyers and victims who were permitted to watch the closed-door sessions.

Dressed in an expensive suit and reading quickly in a matter-of-fact tone from a prepared statement, they said, Mancuso testified that his men had paid the army and police in one region $400,000 a month for their cooperation, and that paramilitaries had coerced voters at gunpoint to support regional and presidential candidates who favored the paramilitaries' agenda.

Mancuso's admission so far of involvement in at least 70 crimes in northwestern Colombia is part of a peace deal that promises demobilized militia leaders a maximum of eight years' incarceration, no matter the severity of their crimes, in exchange for full confessions and payment of reparations to victims.

Mancuso is among about 30,000 members of rightist militias who have laid down their arms since late 2003, and one of more than 2,000 who are expected to confess to grave crimes to take advantage of lighter sentences.

A wealthy cattleman who studied at the University of Pittsburgh, Mancuso helped found civilian militias in the 1980s, financed by rich landowners to combat attacks and extortion by leftist guerrillas. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, morphed into shadowy armies that tortured and massacred civilians and became major drug traffickers.

The U.S. State Department classifies the AUC as a foreign terrorist organization. Several of its leaders, including Mancuso, are wanted in the United States for cocaine trafficking, but the government peace deal shields them from extradition as long as they comply with its terms.

Mancuso, who also testified in December, is the first of 59 top militia leaders held in a maximum-security prison to give his account of extensive links with the military and police, from weapons and flight training to logistical support, selection of civilian targets for massacres, and material aid.

Human rights groups have long accused the Colombian military and police, which receive some $700 million in annual funding from the United States, of collaborating with right-wing militias. But Mancuso's testimony is the first confession to detail those links, down to the names of generals and colonels who supposedly worked hand-in- glove with illegal militias.

General Freddy Padilla, the commander of the Colombian armed forces, released a statement Tuesday denying that the military had colluded with militias and defending a decorated general, now dead, whom Mancuso accused of extensive cooperation in planning massacres.

Mancuso also cited a local prosecutor who is now a fugitive from justice believed to be in the United States, who he said had supplied names of suspected leftists to be targeted for assassination and tipped off paramilitaries to state investigations and operations against them.

He is expected to resume his testimony Jan. 25 with details of the financing of the paramilitary networks by wealthy elites and the structure of drug-trafficking networks. In an interview during his disarmament in late 2004, Mancuso said he hoped to run for Senate after serving his time at one of the prison farms where the state has told militiamen they will pay their debt to society.

Details of Mancuso's testimony have riveted the nation, coming on the heels of revelations the last two months of links between paramilitaries and politicians allied with the U.S.-backed president, Álvaro Uribe.

Victims interviewed after the proceedings said that Mancuso used his court time for political grandstanding, listing his crimes with a cold-hearted air, justifying them as acts of counterinsurgency and claiming not to know locations of hidden graves.

"He's manipulating us and the prosecutors," said Teresita Gaviria, the president of an association of victims who are demanding that Mancuso reveal the whereabouts of more than 150 missing family members.

But lawyers and human rights groups said his statements could be crucial in exposing elites who aided death squads and could help the nation heal from a traumatic period.

Gustavo Gallón, director of the Colombian Commission of Jurists, acknowledged that many senior military and police officials whom Mancuso implicated are conveniently dead, imprisoned or fugitives from justice.

But Gallón said that Mancuso told prosecutors that he could identify other military men whose names he did not know from photographs.

"Even though Mancuso's declaration leaves a lot to fill out the truth, it nonetheless narrates the complicity and the multiple links that existed between the 'paras' and the security forces," Gallón said.

But like many observers, he said he did not expect the militia leaders to reveal links to current top political and military leaders, for fear of reprisals.

Pobre Pinchao

POBRE PINCHAO
por Alberto AGUIRRE

Jhon Frank Pinchao, subintendente de Policía, estuvo secuestrado por las Farc durante casi nueve años. Escapó de sus secuestradores en lo profundo de la selva amazónica, el 28 de abril. Durante 17 días, como dice la CNN, cargando inclusive las cadenas con las que lo habían tenido aherrojado, “Pinchao caminó, nadó y se arrastró” por esas selvas enmarañadas hasta ser rescatado, el miércoles 15 de mayo, por una patrulla antinarcóticos. Llevado a Bogotá, contó los horrores del cautiverio a que eran sometidos, él, y los demás secuestrados.

Duermen con cadenas al cuello, uncidos unos a otros. Que les ponían las cadenas a las 6 de la tarde; dormían con ellas y se las quitaban a las 5 y 30 de la mañana, hora en que se las quitaban y los hacían levantar. Contó que los tres “contratistas” norteamericanos, allí mismo secuestrados –Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell y Thomas Howes– no eran encadenados, pues nunca intentaron escapar. Según Joshua Goodman, corresponsal de la Associated Press, en despacho desde Bogotá (18 de mayo) el presidente Uribe dijo en una ceremonia militar: “El testimonio de Pinchao demuestra que los campos de concentración de las Farc son más crueles que los campos de concentración de los nazis”. Y dijo que Pinchao ingresaría al servicio diplomático, como “embajador de secuestrados”, para contar en el mundo las infamias de las Farc.
En corresponsalía de la Associated Press, suscrita por Toby Muse, enviada desde Bogotá (10 de julio), se lee textualmente: “La rápida recuperación de Pinchao luego de casi nueve años de cautiverio, le ha dado esperanzas a Jo Rosano, la madre de Marc Gonsalves, para el día en que su hijo sea liberado. Dijo la señora Rosano: ‘Realmente, el cautiverio no ha de ser tan terrible como yo lo temía. Es lo que deduzco al considerar qué fácil se acomoda Pinchao a su nueva situación, y cómo se ve de bien físicamente’ ”.
Dice Pinchao que hacía gimnasia con Íngrid y que ésta le daba clases de francés. Y que Gonsalves, el americano secuestrado con sus compatriotas Stansell y Howes, le daba clases de inglés. Dotado de los rudimentos de estos dos idiomas, que es a lo que alcanza cualquier colombiano bisoño que representa al país en el exterior, Pinchao ya está habilitado para la carrera diplomática que le ofreció el Señor Presidente. ¿Por qué está tan demorado el nombramiento? Ha de saberse en San Carlos que el doctor José Obdulio Gaviria le enseñó a manejar celular, aparatico indispensable para un diplomático a la carrera.
Ya cumplió la primera misión, aunque no fue muy feliz el resultado. La revista Cambio (11 de junio), dándole el honor de la portada, con gran retrato en primer plano, en colores, obviamente, dice en grandes letras, al pie del retrato: “PINCHAO HUNDE A TRINIDAD”. Y acota, en letra más menuda: “El testimonio del policía Jhon Frank Pinchao es la prueba reina que conecta a Simón Trinidad con los tres militares estadounidenses secuestrados por las Farc”. El oficio del periodista es dar noticia de los hechos ocurridos, y no la de anunciar los que van a ocurrir. El periodista ni es arúspice ni es profeta. Tampoco es portavoz del Gobierno ni paje palaciego. Su oficio es dar cuenta de los hechos ya ocurridos, con la mayor fidelidad posible, ceñido estrictamente a la verdad. Cuando se pone a anunciar hechos eventuales, por fuerza falta a la verdad, que es el primer deber del periodista. Especular con hechos futuros te lleva al terreno cenagoso de la adivinación. El periodista informa sobre los hechos ocurridos; no es su misión anunciar hechos posibles. No es adivino sino periodista. En este caso, Cambio dio noticia de lo que iba a ocurrir, o sea, faltó a su deber primario de periodista. Da la circunstancia agravante de que el hecho anunciado no ocurrió. Cuando en la Corte de Justicia norteamericana le preguntaron a Pinchao por Trinidad, contestó: “Yo nunca he visto a Trinidad”.
Cambio se le adelantó a la liebre. Y le resultó un sapo.

PAX ROMANA

por Alberto AGUIRRE

Le preguntaron a López Michelsen en la W, el 29 de junio, cuál sería su consejo en la situación creada por el asesinato de los diputados del Valle, y contestó: “No sé cuál pueda ser el consejo, pero creo que no se está buscando una solución sino la victoria”.



Llamaron entonces al ministro del Interior y de Justicia, Carlos Holguín Sardi, para que comentara tal aserto, y dijo: “Bueno, es que la victoria también es una solución”. Aquél, el de López Michelsen, es el talante liberal; éste, el de Holguín, es el talante totalitario. Porque la victoria, en una contienda colectiva, nunca ha sido una solución. No conduce a la paz, como armonía y ausencia de conflictos. En general, los enciende por otra vía o con otros grupos próximos. En Gaza, los israelitas han logrado, no una, sino seis victorias sobre los palestinos, pero no por eso se ha logrado la solución del antiquísimo conflicto. Los ejércitos americanos han logrado la victoria sobre Sadam Hussein y sus seguidores, y sobre el pueblo y el gobierno de Iraq, pero no se ha logrado la solución del conflicto, cada vez más mortífero y virulento.
En el mejor de los casos, la victoria conduce a lo que se dice la pax romana, que así se llamó la que impusieron las legiones de Augusto en vastas regiones del Imperio. Esa paz, en las palabras de Beyreuth y Koenen (Diccionario teológico del Nuevo Testamento, Salamanca, 2003) “consiste en el sometimiento del aparato político religioso por la vía de las armas, y en la expoliación económica de la sociedad”. Lo que también se llama “la paz de los sepulcros”. Tan distinta a la paz cristiana, “que designa unas condiciones positivas de paz, alegría, reciprocidad humana, armonía social, justicia”.
En la manifestación contra el secuestro, en Cali, el 5 de julio, Carolina Charry, joven universitaria de 20 años de edad, dijo un discurso previamente escrito, que inició así: “Buenas tardes. Soy Carolina, hija del diputado Carlos Alberto Charry, asesinado por las Farc con la complicidad del Gobierno Nacional que fue inferior a su compromiso de devolverlos con vida. Gracias por movilizarse para rechazar las políticas del Gobierno, que están manchadas con la sangre de mi amado padre y de sus diez compañeros asesinados con él, a quienes un presidente indolente se negó a escuchar cuando le suplicaron en todos los tonos declarar a Pradera y Florida zona de encuentro para el acuerdo humanitario”. Conmueve el treno de su dolor: “Soy una colombiana que hace más de cinco años no puede abrazar a su padre, no puede contarle sus sueños, no puede sentir su protección, no puede recibir su bendición cada día, no puede mirarlo a los ojos y decirle: Te amo con todo mi corazón, te necesito, no puedo seguir viviendo sin ti”.
Allí presente, el ministro Holguín hizo mofa y escarnio de Carolina Charry. Dijo: “Es una niñita”; dijo: “Es inmadura”; dijo: “Está respirando por la herida”. Qué inclemencia. Qué dureza de corazón. Parece que lo tuviera envuelto, no en venas y sangre, sino en asbesto. Es el que se necesita para imponer la pax romana. Cómo será el dolor de Carolina Charry; cuán grande ha de ser el tamaño de su herida. Y dice Holguín, despiadado, que esa herida no le sirve a esta hija para el dolor sino para la venganza. Es infame. Dentro de esa misma vena guerrerista, el presidente Uribe dijo (Caracol, 4 de julio) que no habrá despeje ni acuerdo humanitario con las Farc, anotando: “Nos quedan tres años. Vamos ganando. Lo único es derrotarlos”. Pax romana.
Quizás convenga al menos por un tiempo vivir bajo la ilusión y el engaño de la paz de los sepulcros. En la 1ª página de El Mundo (18 de julio) se leen estas cuatro noticias: 1) “Plagiadas 2 personas en Abejorral, por las Farc”, 2) “Asesinado líder de la comunidad de paz de San José de Apartadó, por paramilitares”, 3) “El miedo aún manda en La Sierra, Comuna de Medellín”, 4) “En riesgo de muerte 200 alcaldes del país, por amenazas de diversos grupos armados”.

Rats and Cats Work to Sniff Out Mines

The Associated Press
Tuesday, July 24, 2007; 10:47 PM

BOGOTA, Colombia -- Who says Tom and Jerry can't be friends? For the past year, a special Colombian police unit has been locking rats in cages with cats as part of a project to train the rodents to sniff out the more than 100,000 landmines planted mostly by leftist rebels across this conflict-wracked Andean country.

Bringing the rats face to face with an enemy allows them to stay more focused once they are released, veterinarian Luisa Mendez, who's been working with the animals for two years, told The Associated Press on Tuesday.

"Here the cats play with the rats instead of attacking them," Mendez said. "The cats wear shields on their nails so they can't cause any injuries and as a result the rats feel comfortable playing around them."

The rodents are taught to freeze in front of mines, but had difficulty staying put for fear of being attacked by predators.

Col. Javier Cifuentes, who oversees the project, said the rats' success rate in mine detection is 96 percent. Unlike dogs, the rats weigh a lot less and therefore don't trigger explosions.

Colombia is home to the world's largest number of land mine victims. Last year, there were 1,108 victims, or about one every eight hours, the government says. Nearly a quarter of the victims die from their injuries.

The nation's rat project was recognized last month as one of the five most innovative projects at a conference of behavior psychologists in Mexico, and its initial findings will soon be presented at a similar conference in Argentina.

VALORACIÓN SOBRE EL PROCESO DE DESMOVILIZACIÓN DE LOS PARAMILITARES

Después de muchas investigaciones sobre el fenómeno paramilitar se ha ido concluyendo tanto nacional como internacionalmente que este corresponde a una estrategia del Estado para realizar crímenes que no puede hacer y reivindicar directamente sin deslegitimarse; al respecto basta con analizar los informes y recomendaciones hechas por la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la OEA o del los informes de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de Derechos Humanos de la ONU en Colombia.

En las Resoluciones sobre casos de violación de Derechos Humanos de la OEA, en los cuales se condena al Estado Colombiano, es igualmente claro que se ha utilizado a los paramilitares para cometer crímenes contra los opositores políticos y dirigentes de movimientos sociales, ver por ejemplo resoluciones sobre caso del Alcalde de Sabana de Torres, dr. Alvaro Garces Parra; Masacre de los Uvos, Masacre de Caloto, Masacre de Riofrío, Masacre de Segovia, ejecución de Manuel Cepeda Vargas, etc.

En las sentencias condenatorias contra el Estado Colombiano de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de la OEA, en las masacres de: los 19 comerciantes, Mapiripan, el Aro e Ituango, Masacre Judicial de la Rochela, etc. se ha dejado claramente establecido que el paramilitarismo es de creación legal del Estado, que ha actuado conjuntamente con las fuerzas paramilitares, que ha dejado o permitido que se realicen las masacres, que no ha perseguido a los mismos criminales a pesar de tener retenes por donde han pasado de ida y vuelta luego de cometer los crímenes, etc.

Que los diálogos realizados por el Gobierno Nacional con esta organización han sido de carácter secreto o reservado, que no se conoce públicamente de la firma de ningún acuerdo y que durante la llamada “tregua unilateral”, desde 2002 se han seguido cometiendo crímenes de lesa humanidad contra la población civil en todas las áreas en donde ellos tienen presencia y control, se han documentado aproximadamente 30120 casos de homicidios y detenciones desapariciones por parte de los paramilitares, sin que el gobierno haya dicho nada al respecto. Trabajo realizado por la Comisión Colombiana de Juristas

Es de público conocimiento que muchos de los hoy voceros paramilitares, antes de comprar las franquicias eran narcotraficantes reconocidos, casos como los de Gordo Lindo, Don Berna, Los hermanos Luís y Miguel Ángel Mejia, el de Mancuso o Carlos Castaño, etc, los cuales habían sido solicitados en extradición por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos o Italia en Europa. Al respecto también es importante destacar que según las declaraciones del mismo Castaño ellos se financian en un 70% del negocio de narcotráfico, el resto es producto del secuestro la extorsión y el robo de los presupuestos Municipales y el robo de los bienes de las víctimas.

El Congreso tramitó una ley para concederles beneficios jurídicos y políticos a los paramilitares, la cual se conoce como Ley 975 del 2005 o de “Justicia y Paz”; en declaraciones públicas Mancuso y Vicente Castaño reconocieron que el 35 del Congreso era de ellos, es decir, es una ley tramitada para beneficio propio. Hoy luego de las elecciones el solo partido de la U, obtuvo el 70% del Congreso, en consecuencia nos debemos preguntar ¿cuantos Congresistas son representantes de los paramilitares?.

El marco jurídico que ha posibilitado el dialogo y negociación o el monologo, han sido la ley 782 del 2002, su decreto reglamentario 128 que ha permitido que cerca de 32.000 paramilitares lo hayan hecho en procesos colectivos y aproximadamente 6000 los hayan hecho individualmente. Según declaraciones públicas del Alto Comisionado Dr. Restrepo y del Ex Ministro del Interior Dr. Sabas, les han concedido beneficios de cesación de procedimiento, autos inhibitorios, indultos, etc. Y solamente 2695 han quedado pendientes por tener ordenes de captura vigentes y que son quienes se someten a la ley 975 de Justicia y Paz y a sus decretos reglamentarios 4760 ambos del 2005 y 3391 de 2006; posteriormente se expide otro decreto y una resolución de la Fiscalía que reglamenta la participación de las víctimas, para hacerla nugatoria y negar por esta vía el fallo de la Corte Constitucional y el avance de su fallo. Adicionalmente se ha anunciado públicamente que unos 1600 presos han solicitado acogerse a esta ley para ser acreedores a sus beneficios. Hoy en día las peticiones son de aproximadamente 3650. Luego del proceso de “legalización o desmovilización” han vuelto a recapturar unos 1.200 y han sido asesinados aproximadamente 600. ¿se busca eliminar evidencias o testigos que tienen información sobre los jefes o beneficiarios políticos, económicos o militares?

Las víctimas de crímenes del paramilitarismo se calculan según los datos de los bancos de datos de las organizaciones de derechos humanos en aproximadamente 3.600.000 millones seiscientos mil desplazados, 8.000 casos de detenciones desapariciones, 65.000 ejecuciones individuales o colectivas. De estos 14.700 corresponden al periodo comprendido entre el 1988 y 2003 y de ahí a la fecha se calculan unos 3100; no se tienen registros sobre violaciones de carácter sexual por la ausencia de denuncias y el robo de tierras se calcula en 6 millones de hectáreas. Las organizaciones más afectadas lo han sido la Unión Patriótica y el Partido Comunista, la CUT, los campesinos de Anuc Ur y Fensuagro, Los indígenas, los sectores de Iglesia popular, las juntas de acción comunal y las organizaciones de derechos humanos, entre otras.

En la asamblea nacional del Movimiento de Víctimas de crímenes de Estado, al escuchar los informes regionales, se constató que el fenómeno del paramilitarismo sigue activo en las diferentes regiones, que llamaron a personas de apoyo, las entrenaron, armaron y uniformaron y luego los presentaron como desmovilizados conjuntamente con una parte de la estructura armada - la que no tenía muchos problemas jurídicos o no estaba plenamente identificada, que trasladaron estructuras para diferentes frentes, y que conservan lo esencial de su poder militar, político, económico y social en las zonas de control. Esta verdad se confirma luego con los distintos informes de la Misión de la OEA - lego de cumplido su papel de legitimar el paramilitarismo - con los informes de inteligencia del Estado y con las declaraciones de los mismos voceros paramilitares que nos hablan de la “nueva generación del paramilitarismo”; según inteligencia militar hay se habla de unos 70 grupos, que actúan en las mismas zonas donde estaban antes. Para nosotros siguen siendo las mismas políticas del Estado legalizadas y legitimadas y los mismos criminales a sueldo al servicio de las empresas transnacionales y el capital nacional.

Es muy importante destacar que quien tramito el proyecto de ley del Gobierno lo fue el señor vice- ministro de Justicia Dr. Mario Iguaran y que luego de aprobada fue postulado en la lista para la Fiscalía y efectivamente la Corte Suprema de Justicia lo nombró para el cargo, esto significa que él doctor Iguaran, nombró los 20 fiscales y los 150 auxiliares, en consecuencia nos preguntamos ¿será esta administración de justicia, independiente, autónoma e imparcial?.

Esta ley 975 del 2005 fue demandada por muchas personas y organizaciones, luego de su tramite la Corte Constitucional ha aprobado condicionadamente la misma, y lo que ha quedado claro luego de los fallos en lo que nos compete en este momento es lo siguiente:

a) La confesión tiene que ser plena o completa, sino lo hace puede perder al futuro los beneficios jurídicos que les conceden. b) Tienen que responder con la totalidad de los bienes y devolverlos o entregarlos, tanto los de origen ilícito como los de su patrimonio licito; para que con ellos de repare en algo a las víctimas y sus organizaciones. c) El tiempo que han pasado en las zonas de concentración no se toma en cuenta como parte de la pena, la cual les concedía una rebaja máxima de 18 meses. d) Las penas alternativas de 5 a 8 años se tienen que cumplir en una cárcel manejada por el INPEC, y no en sus residencias o fincas particulares como lo venían haciendo hasta ahora. e) El delito de Sedición fue declarado inconstitucional por vicios de trámite, lo que significa que siguen siendo delincuentes comunes utilizados por el Estado en su estrategia para reprimir las organizaciones de oposición. Esto significa igualmente que estas personas no pueden ser empleados públicos, no tienen derecho a indultos o amnistías y pueden ser objeto de extradición. f) Las víctimas y sus organizaciones pueden constituirse en Parte Civil en los procesos penales desde el inicio mismo del proceso, aún en preliminares para garantizar sus derechos a la verdad histórica, a la justicia y reparación integral en los términos establecidos en tutelas anteriores por la Corte Constitucional.

Sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Colombia.

Según la información disponible en la Coordinación Colombia Europa - Estados Unidos- entidad que trabaja en derechos civiles y políticos y realiza el trabajo de interlocución nacional e internacional sobre el tema, encontramos que la situación de las violaciones a los derechos humanos sigue siendo grave, generalizada y sistemática. No ha mejorado sino que se mantiene en niveles muy preocupantes o en algunos casos han cambiado las modalidades de represión y control social de la población, veamos: “Entre Julio de 2002 y Junio de 2006, en promedio, mas de siete personas (7.8) fueron asesinadas o desaparecidas forzadamente cada día, por fuera de combate, a consecuencia de la violencia sociopolítica. Durante este cuatrienio, fueron asesinadas o desaparecidas 11.292 personas”. “Durante este periodo, agentes estatales asesinaron o desaparecieron a 908 personas (en promedio 227 cada año). Respecto a los seis años anteriores, esa cifra representa un incremento del 73% (en promedio 131 cada año)”. “Si bien es cierto que es notoria la disminución del número de personas muertas en masacres perpetradas por grupos paramilitares, las muertes selectivas se mantienen prácticamente en el nivel registrado desde 1996. Entre Julio de 2002 y Junio de 2006, en promedio, cada año, 833 personas murieron en masacres realizadas por paramilitares. Durante los seis años anteriores, el promedio anual fue de 895 personas”. “Según la información de la Escuela Nacional Sindical, en el año 2005 se presentaron 67 casos de homicidios de sindicalistas y en el 2006 fueron 71 casos”.

....Debe quedar claro que este proceso esta concebido para legalizar y legitimar el paramilitarismo y dejar en la impunidad la gran mayoría de los delitos cometidos, ya que por lo menos el 97% de los victimarios están libres y gozando de los beneficios económicos, políticos y sociales anteriores. Esto significa que la lucha contra la impunidad sigue más vigente que nunca.

Finalmente es importante destacar que en el momento se hace indispensable ayudar para que todas las víctimas de las violaciones a los derechos humanos se organicen a nivel Departamental y nacionalmente en una sola organización para que se les reconozca como sujetos de derechos y se les de la vocería en el tramite de estos procesos y para que se les reconozca como actores en los procesos de lucha contra la impunidad; nuestros derechos a conocer la verdad histórica, a que haya aplicación de justicia; a la reparación integral por todos los daños causados y las garantías de no repetición son innegociables y nosotros no podemos aceptar que estos se negocien por otros y menos por los mismos victimarios. Nosotros creemos y defendemos en la democracia real, directa con nuestros propios voceros y defendemos nuestro derecho a decidir sobre el futuro de nuestros hijos y de nuestro pueblo.

Para finalizar considero que es importante reflexionar sobre la seguridad de nuestros compañeros, para garantizar la continuidad del trabajo y la difusión o transmisión de la experiencia a los demas trabajadores de derechos humanos en general. Creemos en este sentido que se debe valorar el proceso de hermanamiento internacional, con nuestros pares o con organizaciones de solidaridad como Brigadas Internacionales de Paz, etc. Como podemos confiar en el DAS o la Policía o el Ejército, después de leer o escuchar las declaraciones de Salvatore Mancuso cuando dijo en la versión de Justicia y paz: “...nosotros pagábamos a los militares mil millones de pesos mensuales por colaboración, información o por trabajos conjuntos...” o cuando en el proceso que se adelanta contra el vocero paramilitar se descubre en su computador que este criminal ejecutaba a los dirigentes sindicales o populares en la Costa por orden del jefe del DAS, doctor Noguera, entidad que realizaba el estudio de la posible víctima y estos paramilitares la ejecutaban. Posteriormente leímos las declaraciones de jefe de informática del DAS, señor García cuando dijo en la revista Semana:

“Semana:¿también había infiltración y colaboración con narcotraficantes?. Rafael García: A Diego Montoya le pasaban información reservada Giancarlo (Auque) y Jorge Noguera. La idea no era para que se moviera, sino para avisarle que había un soplón dentro de su organización que estaba informando dónde estaba ubicado...” (Revista semana No.667 de Abril de 2006). ¿Cómo se puede confiar en la autoridad?, pero más grave aun ¿Cómo podemos confiarle nuestra seguridad a ellos?. Habrá que pensar entonces en los mecanismos de autoprotección y en el acompañamiento internacional.

Cordialmente,

EDUARDO CARREÑO WILCHES. COPORACIÓN COLECTIVO DE ABOGADOS JOSE ALVEAR RESTREPO. CORPORACIÓN COLECTIVO DE ABOGADOS “JAR”. MIEMBRO DEL MOVIMIENTO DE VICTIMAS DE CRIMENES DE ESTADO. MIEMBRO DE LA: CCE-EU MIEMBRO DE LA: ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL POR LA PAZ. Abril de 2007

Colombia's paramilitaries freeze cooperation with authorities

The Associated Press

Published: July 24, 2007

BOGOTA, Colombia: Colombia's peace process with far-right paramilitaries plunged into a new crisis Tuesday after warlords vowed to stop cooperating with prosecutors investigating their role in some of the country's worst civilian massacres.

The decision was made to protest the Supreme Court's recent ruling that a demobilized paramilitary fighter in Antioquia state is not entitled to special benefits as a former subversive.

The reversal is the latest blow to a fragile 2003 peace accord that has led some 31,000 right-wing fighters to disarm but has been so far unable to provide reparations to their victims or wrest major confessions from some 60 jailed paramilitary warlords.

"With this decision the reconstruction of the historical truth, the handing over of mass graves and other legal obligations assumed under the peace pact are frozen," said Antonio Lopez, a spokesman for the jailed paramilitary bosses. "We can't allow our fighters to be treated like common criminals."

President Alvaro Uribe said Tuesday he disagreed with the court's ruling even as his ministers pledged to put the peace process back on track.

"I've repeated several times in the past five years of government: if the guerrillas are recognized as subversives, the same criteria should be applied to the paramilitaries," Uribe said.

On July 11, the Supreme Court quietly upheld a lower court ruling denying Orlando Cesar Caballero, a member of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, benefits such as a maximum eight-year jail sentence in exchange for renouncing violence and confessing crimes to special prosecutors.

"To accept that instead of criminal conspiracy, paramilitary members committed treason not only supposes they acted with altruistic aims for the collective good, but also flaunts the rights of victims and society to obtain justice and truth," the court said.

Interior Minister Carlos Holguin said Tuesday he hoped to convince paramilitary bosses to fulfill their peace pledges at an August 14 meeting at the Itagui maximum security prison where they are being held.

"They have other institutional and legal mechanisms at their disposal and acting in this manner puts at risk their continued participation in the peace process," Holguin said.

Paramilitaries accuse the government of backtracking on pledges made at the negotiating table after the the country's highest legal authority last May overturned key components of the legal framework under which the militias disarmed.

The paramilitaries were formed by wealthy ranchers in the 1980's to fight marauding leftist rebels, but they eventually took a leading role in Colombia's lucrative cocaine trade.

Several of the jailed warlords have been indicted for drug-trafficking by U.S. federal courts, but Uribe has suspended their extradition orders so long as they continue to abide by the peace deal.

Hasta aqui llego el proceso con los paras....

The Associated Press

BOGOTA --

Un vocero de las desmovilizadas Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia dijo el martes que los paramilitares suspendieron sus confesiones en el marco del proceso de paz debido a una decisión de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

El portavoz Antonio López dijo en rueda de prensa que la CSJ, hace dos semanas, no quiso reconocer el delito de sedición al paramilitar Orlando Caballero, quien por su parte no quería ser juzgado por el delito común de concierto para delinquir.

"Con eso, simplemente la reconstrucción de la verdad histórica, la entrega de fosas, toda la participación del compromiso jurídico que se había asumido en el marco de la ley queda congelado", declaró López.

Los principales jefes paramilitares iniciaron hace más de dos meses las confesiones de sus delitos ante fiscales que estudiarán sus casos regidos por la Ley de Justicia y Paz, diseñada para juzgar a los integrantes de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, organización que dijo combatir las acciones violentas de la guerrilla izquierdista.

Según las declaraciones de López, la determinación de la CSJ desconoce el "carácter político" a las Autodefensas. "No permitiremos que nuestros hombres sean juzgados como criminales o delincuentes comunes", agregó.

El presidente Alvaro Uribe, dijo en Medellín, la tercera ciudad del país a unos 250 kilómetros al noroeste de Bogotá que "si se le reconoce sedición a la guerrilla, se le debe reconocer sedición con los mismos elementos al paramilitarismo".

Señaló que eso lo ha estado predicando a lo largo de cinco años de su gobierno.

Más de 31.000 hombres de las AUC se desmovilizaron y entregaron sus armas luego de firmar un acuerdo con el gobierno tras cerca de tres años de negociaciones.

La Otra verdad
http://www.laotraverdad.com.co/analisis1.html

¿QUE GRAVE SECRETO LE GUARDA NOGUERA A URIBE ?

Algunos ciudadanos piden que la Fiscalía les aplique el famoso polígrafo al informante Rafael García y a Jorge Noguera.

Al presidente Álvaro Uribe no le ha temblado el pulso para sacar del Gobierno a cualquier funcionario acusado de corrupción que le cause molestias o que le resulte incómodo por una u otra circunstancia (con excepción de Fabio Echeverri). Sacó a Campo; a Gallego; a Trujillo Polanco; a Plazas; al general Gabriel Díaz (sin justificación); al general Duván Pineda; al director del DANE, César Caballero; al superintendente de vigilancia Fernando Segura; al director del Incoder, Luis Ortiz, etc., etc., pero no se atrevió a tocar a Jorge Noguera, ex cónsul de Colombia en Milán (Italia), quien dejó el cargo sólo por la presión de la Fiscalía General de la Nación.

¿Qué grave secreto le guarda Noguera a Uribe? motivo por el cual lo mantuvo anclado en el consulado italiano, se preguntan en la calle los ciudadanos. Noguera debe defenderse de las graves acusaciones que le hizo su mejor amigo, el ex jefe de Informática del DAS, Rafael García Torres, reo en la Picota. ¿Qué pasaría si a Noguera lo encausa la Fiscalía nacional y no le queda otro remedio que “cantar la marsellesa”?, se preguntan los ciudadanos.

El secreto de Noguera debe ser muy grande y comprometedor, al punto de que también se dice que este personaje es, hoy por hoy, el “único enemigo” que tiene el presidente Uribe. ¿Qué pasaría si Noguera decide hablar y cuenta todo lo que sabe o prende el ventilador como García? El destape de Noguera produciría lo que ningún político ha logrado en cuatro años: bajarle a Uribe, por lo menos, un 20% de popularidad que ostenta en las encuestas presidenciales. Noguera sería algo así como un J. Edgar Hoover, el hombre que le conocía la vida íntima a los más poderosospersonajes de la política estadounidense.

Algunos ciudadanos incluso piden que la Fiscalía les aplique el famoso polígrafo al informante García Torres y a Noguera para ver quién dice la verdad. Y muchos lamentan el hecho de que no se pueda someter a este aparato al mismo Uribe, por su fuero presidencial.

El hipotético secreto de Noguera, dicen en la calle, es comparable al que supuestamente le guardó durante años “el mejor policía del mundo”, el General Rosso José Serrano Cadena, conocido como el “General Serrucho” por el libro del periodista Manuel Vicente Peña, a Ernesto Samper. Este secreto sería la causa por la cual Samper nunca se desprendió de Serrano, a quien hasta volvió su más importante interlocutor ante los Estados Unidos, para negociar helicópteros, aviones y toda clase de ayuda para Colombia, especialmente para la Policía que manejaba el propio Serrano. A Uribe también le tocó aguantarse a Serrano y, para compensarlo, lo mandó de embajador a Austria para que nos representara ante ese país y los diferentes organismos del sistema de la ONU, con sede en Viena, como el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para la Fiscalización Internacional de Drogas, de donde nunca se han conocido noticias suyas.

LOS GRINGOS YA LO CONTACTARON

Personal de algunas agencias de Estados Unidos ya contactaron al informante García Torres y están interesados en conocer, de primera mano, todos los detalles del caso de corrupción en el DAS que se ha ventilado en los medios.

Los gringos ya poseen información valiosa, adquirida mediante sus propias investigaciones y a través de contactos y personas cercanas al DAS, y no son ajenos a lo que estuvo y está sucediendo en esa institución.

Por el lado de la justicia venezolana también buscan acercamiento con García Torres y este podría ser testigo clave en ese país del proceso que se sigue por la muerte del fiscal general de esa nación, Danilo Anderson.

ORDEN DE CAPTURA EN VENEZUELA

Pero lo más inquietante del caso es que la Fiscalía de Venezuela está terminando de recopilar pruebas para tomar la decisión de dictar o no orden de captura contra Jorge Noguera, dentro del proceso que se lleva por la muerte de Anderson. La orden de captura no es de obligatorio cumplimiento para las autoridades colombianas, pero ¿qué tal que Venezuela le pida a nuestro país aplicar la medida en aras de los

acuerdos binacionales que se juraron cumplir a raíz del sonado caso del guerrillero Rodrigo Granda, el llamado “Canciller” de las Farc, que paradójicamente manejó Noguera desde el DAS, por ser un tema de seguridad nacional?

Hay que aclarar que no todo lo que ha dicho el ex empleado del DAS García Torres está comprobado y sustentado con pruebas reales o documentales. Noguera, hasta el momento, no ha sido vencido en juicio, por lo cual no está condenado y muchas de las denuncias son las palabras de su íntimo amigo García Torres contra las de él, pero resulta que sería muy diciente queal ex Cónsul en Milán le dictaran una orden de captura los venezolanos y pusieran a laINTERPOL a cumplirla, organismo policiaco que paradójicamente él manejó en el DAS a su antojo.

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RAUL MONTOYA EN "EL GENERAL SERRUCHO "

Cuando surgió la publicación de las revistas Semana y Cambio sobre el escándalo del DAS en la semana de pasión, al principio de abril de 2006, el presidente Álvaro Uribe salió de inmediato ofuscado y ofendido en todos los medios radiales y televisivos a defender a su íntimo amigo, hombre de confianza y jefe de su campaña en el Magdalena, Raúl Montoya Flórez, a quien calificó como un personaje probo, diáfano y cristalino con estas palabras que fueron tomadas por El Espectador el domingo 23 de abril: “Y, ahora, entonces le van a quitar legitimidad a este Gobierno cambiando a don Raúl Montoya, un hombre honesto que vive en Santa Marta, por Diego Montoya, un narcotraficante. Hombre, no hayderecho a que pongan a los colombianos a leer unas revistas importantes en Semana Santa que violan la Constitución, que violan el derecho a la intimidad y al buen nombre de las personas, que le cambian al ciudadano el nombre que ha tenido, reconocido como el nombre de una persona honesta, por el nombre de un narcotraficante, para hacerle semejantes imputaciones. A mí me da hasta pena con don Raúl Montoya. Pregunten ustedes en Santa Marta quién es don Raúl Montoya”.

Sin embargo, luego de que el Nuevo Herald de Miami descubrió y demostró que Montoya estaba enredado en situaciones non sanctas y que Estados Unidos le retiró la visa por sus pasadas relaciones con narcotraficantes, lo cual precipitó su renuncia como representante de la campaña uribista en Santa Marta, y luego de que El Espectador también revelara que tuvo nexos con Luis Carlos Molina Yepes, el administrador de la cuenta corriente 005-21826-8 de donde salieron los cheques para que asesinaran al periodista Guillermo Cano, de donde también le giraron cinco cheques a Montoya, el presidente Uribe no ha salido más a los medios a hablar de las bondades de su amigo y mucho menos ninguno de ellos le ha cuestionado al Primer Mandatario aquella férrea defensa.

Dado que el caso ha sido tan sonado, La otra Verdad Periodismo Investigativo le recuerda a sus lectores lo que se dice textualmente sobre Raúl Montoya en la página 430 del libro “El General Serrucho”,escrito por el periodista Manuel Vicente Peña:

“El otro general serranista, que tiene su historia oculta con la mafia, es el ardil Gustavo Socha Salamanca, director de la Policía Antinarcóticos, quien mantenía una estrecha amistad con Raúl Montoya Flórez, un hombre señalado de tener presuntos nexos con el narcotráfico.

En 1995, Socha estuvo con su esposa y con su hija de vacaciones en Santa Marta y el controvertido Montoya Flórez le prestó durante toda la temporada uno de sus lujosos y costosos apartamentos en El Rodadero, para que se alojaran con todas las comodidades.

Socha, luego, le retribuyó el favor y cuando Montoya Flórez venía a Bogotá se alojaba en la residencia de este narcogeneral. Además, lo invitaba a disparar en los polígonos de la Escuela General Santander de la Policía. Montoya Flórez, incluso, fue nombrado como policía cívico por el coronel Elkin de Jesús Silva Pineda, llamado “El Aceitoso”, entonces comandante de la Policía en el Magdalena”.

U.S. bending rules on Colombia terror?

Several lawmakers say multinationals that aid violent groups in return for protection are not being prosecuted.

By Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writer
July 22, 2007

WASHINGTON — For more than a decade, leftist guerrilla and right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia have kidnapped or killed civilians, trade union leaders, police and soldiers by the hundreds and profited by shipping cocaine and heroin to the United States.

In that time, several American multinational corporations have been accused of essentially underwriting those criminal activities — in violation of U.S. law — by providing cash, vehicles and other financial assistance as insurance against attacks on their employees and facilities in the South American nation.

But only one such company — Chiquita Brands International Inc. — has been charged criminally in the United States. Now, a showdown is looming that pits some members of Congress against the Justice Department and the multinationals — including an American coal-mining company and Coca-Cola bottlers.

The lawmakers say that, in the cases of U.S. corporations in Colombia, the Justice Department has failed to adequately enforce U.S. laws that make it a crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization — and they have opened their own investigation.

Rep. Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.), who is leading the effort, has questioned whether the Bush administration is putting the interests of U.S. conglomerates ahead of its counter-terrorism agenda.

Even the plea agreement reached with Chiquita in March — in which it acknowledged making the illegal payments — has been criticized as far too lenient by many outside legal experts and some high-ranking Justice Department prosecutors.

"I think they've escaped any kind of appropriate sanctions," Delahunt said in an interview last week.

"We will take a good, hard look at how American multinationals operate around the world, using Colombia as a model," said Delahunt, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight. "It really deserves an exhaustive effort to examine where we need legislation and if there are gaps in our criminal code that allow U.S. corporations to aid or abet violence in other countries that erode our credibility and our moral standing in the world."

The Bush administration has declared that a hallmark of its counter-terrorism policy is to go after the financiers of terrorism just as aggressively as the terrorists themselves — anywhere in the world. But the situation in Colombia underscores the difficulty in prosecuting such goals when it conflicts with American economic interests abroad and trade relations with friendly governments. Making the matter particularly sensitive, the U.S. is in the midst of negotiating a free-trade agreement with Colombia, and sends it billions annually in military and other aid.

"Do our economic interests trump the war on terror? Are we making trade-offs?" Delahunt asked. "If we are, at the very least the public should know about it."

Lance Compa, an international trade specialist at Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, acknowledged that there were many competing priorities in Colombia.

"But the general proposition that gross human rights violations should be weighed against trade policy and foreign policy is a mistake," Compa said. "The paramilitaries have infiltrated the highest levels of the [Colombian] government, and the Bush administration is looking the other way.

"It makes it all the more incumbent on U.S. policymakers to put a stop to any corporate dealings with paramilitary death squads."

Dealings outlawed

The right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, initially began as a security force in response to leftist atrocities, but it quickly transformed in the 1990s into a brutal organization with ties to Colombia's military, political and business establishment. The State Department designated the AUC a terrorist organization in 2001, making it a crime to provide the group with financial or other support.

Financial dealings with the paramilitaries have also been outlawed under a federal "drug kingpin" statute, because such groups are believed to supply 90% of the cocaine and 50% of the heroin consumed in the U.S.

For more than four years, lawmakers have been requesting information from the Justice Department about whether it is investigating "credible allegations" against some of the American firms, including some that were named in detailed civil lawsuits and forwarded to prosecutors, according to letters sent to Atty. Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales and his predecessor, John Ashcroft.

The lawmakers are particularly concerned about claims that the Drummond Co. coal-mining operations paid paramilitaries from the AUC to kill three trade union leaders who were trying to organize workers at its coal mines in 2001. Drummond has been accused in a civil lawsuit first filed in 2002 of using the AUC as a de facto security force that intimidated employees to keep them from unionizing and demanding higher wages.

Drummond has strenuously denied the claims and is fighting them in a civil trial that began this month.

In a letter to Ashcroft on June 25, 2003, four lawmakers on House foreign affairs oversight committees urged thorough investigations of the Drummond case and allegations against two U.S.-owned Coca-Cola bottling firms in Colombia that are also accused in lawsuits of colluding with the paramilitaries. The bottlers, which are independent of the Atlanta-based beverage giant, have denied any wrongdoing.

Nearly a year later, Assistant Atty. Gen. William E. Moschella sent a four-paragraph response that said: "We can assure you that this matter is being carefully reviewed." Moschella said the Justice Department could not comment on any case until there were public filings.

The lawmakers said they had been unable to get even basic information about whether an investigation was underway.

A lower priority?

Two senior Justice Department officials acknowledged that violent Colombian groups, particularly the AUC, were not as high a priority as Islamist jihad groups because they had not attacked American interests such as embassies.

But critics say that the Colombian groups have killed and kidnapped more people than Al Qaeda and that the Justice Department's selective enforcement of U.S. laws opens it up to charges of having double standards in the war on terrorism.

The Justice Department says it has aggressively pursued corporate financiers of terrorism, in Colombia and elsewhere.

"The notion that the Justice Department is somehow putting the interests of U.S. companies ahead of its national security priorities is baseless," said spokesman Dean Boyd. "The Justice Department takes seriously any and all allegations about U.S. persons or entities that may have engaged in transactions with specially designated terrorist organizations."

The senior Justice Department officials confirmed that they had launched a probe of Drummond at least several years ago, and that they had looked at other U.S. firms as well. "We were trying to look into any allegation there was of any company doing what Chiquita was doing," one said of the Drummond allegations. "I can't say we pursued every one of them."

Kenneth L. Wainstein, assistant attorney general for national security, said he could not discuss ongoing federal actions.

The lawmakers' concerns intensified after Chiquita reached a plea agreement with the Justice Department in March, in which it admitted having paid the AUC at least $1.7 million between 1997 and 2004, and the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, before that. Chiquita said it did so to protect its workers, contending that the guerrilla and paramilitary groups attacked corporations that refused.

Colombia's chief prosecutor, Mario Iguaran, has accused Chiquita and the AUC of cultivating "a criminal relationship" based on "money and arms and, in exchange, the bloody pacification of Uraba," the region where the Cincinnati-based firm's banana plantations were based until it sold them in 2004.

In May, six congressmen wrote a follow-up letter to Gonzales, asking whether the Justice Department had investigated their "grave concerns" that other companies, particularly Drummond, might be engaging in similar activity. The lawmakers said that Iguaran had launched a criminal investigation of Drummond and that though the allegations were unproved, they were "sufficiently credible" for the Justice Department to launch criminal proceedings of its own.

"If no such probe has begun, we strongly urge that one be started immediately," wrote Reps. Delahunt, Tom Lantos (D-Burlingame), Howard L. Berman (D-Valley Village), George Miller (D-Martinez), Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.) and Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.).

No response

The Justice Department has not responded to that letter, the lawmakers say.

"In the wake of 9/11, it is shocking to me that allegations of payments to terrorist groups have not been aggressively investigated and prosecuted by the Justice Department," Engel said at a June 28 congressional hearing on the issue, the first of what the lawmakers have pledged will be many.

"I can only imagine the force and speed with which the entire prosecutorial force of the United States government would come down on a company alleged to have assisted Al Qaeda or Hezbollah," Engel added.

The congressmen, all top members of foreign affairs panels, vow to haul in top officials from Drummond, Chiquita and other companies (which they would not name) that have done business in Colombia to testify under oath.

At the June congressional hearing, a former Colombian military captain turned AUC soldier; a human rights worker; and a union leader testified that numerous U.S. corporations besides Chiquita and Drummond had been routinely paying off violent groups in Colombia.

This spring, former AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso and group spokesman Ivan Duque alleged that the payoffs were pervasive and long-standing, involving multinational fruit companies such as Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. and Dole Food Co., as well as oil conglomerates and other firms. Del Monte and Dole have denied the allegations.

Many more AUC commanders intend to begin speaking publicly about the financing of their reign of terror "by the banana industry, some coal companies, big national businesses," Duque said in a published interview.

"Those who broke the law must face the consequences, just as we are."

Congressmen eye Chiquita case

The Justice Department took four years to file criminal charges after the banana company admitted to payoffs to violent groups.

By Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writer
July 22, 2007

WASHINGTON — As part of an inquiry into corporate payments to violent groups in Colombia, a group of congressmen wants more details about the Justice Department's handling of the Chiquita Brands International Inc. case, including whether the department was too lenient and why it took four years to file criminal charges after the banana company admitted making payoffs.

In its plea agreement in March, Chiquita acknowledged that senior executives knew about the payments by September 2000 or earlier, and that they continued to make them until February 2004 — nearly a year after its own lawyers and the Justice Department told them to stop.

Congressional investigators say they are particularly interested in an April 2003 meeting in which top Justice Department officials allegedly told Chiquita to cease the payments. Chiquita says the Justice Department's warnings were vague.

Current and former Justice Department officials said in interviews with The Times that the prosecutors handling the Chiquita case had wanted to bring charges of material support of terrorism against the banana company and to pursue charges against some of its top executives by early 2004, if not sooner.

Instead, the firm was charged three years later with one count of "engaging in transactions with a specially designated global terrorist" and was levied a $25-million fine, payable over five years.

With annual revenue of approximately $4.5 billion, Chiquita said the fine would not affect its global operations. No executives were charged.

According to the Justice Department sources, the prosecutors were incensed by Chiquita's continued payments to the right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, after what they described as repeated warnings. But current and former department officials said they were opposed on some matters by political appointees in the department, including David Nahmias, a former deputy assistant attorney general overseeing counter-terrorism.

The U.S. attorney's office in Washington was leading the investigation, in conjunction with Nahmias and others at the Justice Department headquarters a few blocks away.

Nahmias first asked Roscoe C. Howard Jr., then the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, not to conduct search warrants at Chiquita headquarters in Cincinnati — but Howard refused. Then he asked that charges not be filed until Justice Department leadership could meet with a lawyer for the firm's board, former Atty. Gen. Richard L. Thornburgh, the current and former officials said.

Nahmias, now the U.S. attorney in Atlanta, and Howard, in private law practice, declined to comment, saying they could not discuss internal Justice Department deliberations.

Chiquita's "lawyers went all over D.C. to have meetings" with top officials at the Justice Department, the Treasury Department and elsewhere, often without the front-line prosecutors knowing about it, one of the senior Justice Department officials said. "They were trying to cause political pressure." Like others interviewed for this article, the official spoke on the condition of anonymity, saying he was not authorized to discuss the politically sensitive case.

On April 26, 2004, Thornburgh took his case directly to Nahmias, his boss Christopher A. Wray and then-Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft in a two-page confidential letter obtained by The Times. Thornburgh wrote that Chiquita was merely trying to protect its employees and that a criminal prosecution would harm U.S. political and economic relations with Colombia.

"While the department has suggested that a meeting regarding matters of policy is premature until the investigation is complete … in light of the gravity and urgency of these issues, we respectfully request that you meet with representatives of Chiquita," Thornburgh wrote.

Justice Department officials wouldn't comment on whether Ashcroft or his successor as attorney general, Alberto R. Gonzales, ultimately met with Thornburgh or Chiquita board member Roderick M. Hills, a well-connected Republican lawyer in Washington and a former White House counsel and head of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

By mid-2004, Chiquita virtually stopped cooperating with the Justice Department's efforts to gain access to documents and interview company employees, the current and former officials said. "The case was essentially shut down until further notice, and then there was no further notice," said one former prosecutor involved in the case.

As Hills took a lead role for Chiquita in fending off criminal charges, his son-in-law Steve Bunnell was a senior prosecutor in the U.S. attorney's office in Washington. In 2004, Bunnell was appointed head of the office's criminal division, which oversaw the Chiquita investigation and other prosecutions. The entire field office's prosecutorial office considered recusing itself from the case due to the conflict of interest, but ultimately decided only to recuse Bunnell.

Later, senior management in the U.S. attorney's office was also recused from the case.

Hills' role in the case eventually became a major focus of the investigation. He was one of three senior Chiquita executives who told their outside counsel in the spring of 2003 to "just let them sue us, come after us," even as the firm was pledging to cooperate with the Justice Department, according to department officials and court records filed in the case.

And as head of the Chiquita board's audit committee, Hills told fellow board members that "we appear to [be] committing a felony" in December 2003, months before the company stopped the payments, federal court documents show.

Hills, who retired from the Chiquita board last month, declined to comment. Bunnell, who left the Justice Department on Friday for private law practice, did not respond to requests for comment.

When the Justice Department finally settled with Chiquita on March 14, none of the senior executives was charged individually. The department agreed to withhold company officials' names and identifying descriptions from the publicly released charging documents and plea agreement. They identified Hills, for instance, only as "Individual B."

The settlement "was too soft for what they did," one of the senior Justice Department officials said. The deal awaits formal approval by U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth.

"We believe that the settlement was in the best interest of the company," said Chiquita spokesman Michael Mitchell. "We would certainly not characterize $25 million as insignificant."

Jeffrey A. Taylor, interim U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, also defended the settlement, saying the case was investigated aggressively and prosecuted properly. "We think it's a fair and just result," he said. "This one was done by the book."

Meanwhile, Colombia's attorney general, Mario Iguaran, has said he is seeking all of the Justice Department's investigative files on Chiquita, and he has vowed to extradite company officials to face charges in Colombia. The Justice and State departments would not say whether they had received Iguaran's requests or whether they were cooperating.

Mitchell said Chiquita was unaware of any Colombian investigation or extradition threat.

Why the US is losing its war on cocaine

America has spent billions battling the drug industry in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. And the result? Production as high as ever, street prices at a low, and the governments of the region in open revolt. Hugh O'Shaughnessy reports from La Paz, Bolivia

Published: 27 May 2007

The immensely costly "war on drugs" in Latin America is slowly collapsing like a Zeppelin with a puncture. The long-forecast failure for strategies which involve police and military in forcibly suppressing narcotics - first decreed by President Richard Nixon decades ago - is now pitifully evident in Bolivia, one of the poorest countries of the Western hemisphere.

The estimated $25bn (£13bn) that Washington has spent trying to control narcotics over the past 15 years in Latin America seems to have been wasted.

In 2005, according to UN guesses - and, amid merciless political spinning of what few facts there are- Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, the main producers of cocaine, had the capacity to produce 910 metric tons a year. As more productive strains of coca bushes appear, production has been increasing. Unsurprisingly, the price of cocaine on US streets has tumbled, according to the White House drug tzar John Walters, to $135 (£70) a gram, a fraction of the $600 a gram it was fetching in 1981. The purity of cocaine has gone from 60 per cent in mid-2003 to more than 70 per cent last October. Like the conflict in Iraq, the US's other great war is now being visibly lost.

Here, indigent Bolivian President Evo Morales, once a poverty-stricken llama herder and itinerant trumpet player, is resisting pressure from the Bush government to eradicate coca bushes by fire and sword.

The Bolivian leader is no lover of cocaine and his policies are summed up in the slogan "no to drugs, no to cocaine". More than 5,000 hectares of coca bushes were destroyed last year by growers voluntarily. "We did it without violating human rights", says Morales.

But he refuses to ban the consumption of coca leaves, which country people regard as gifts from heaven: the indigenous peoples have been chewing them for thousands of years as an aid to survival at 14,000 feet in the perishingly bleak highlands of the Andes which surround this city.

Their teeth are sometimes discoloured but otherwise they have come to little harm. Morales has no hesitation in saying that his refusal to allow foreigners to dictate Bolivia's policy on what Bolivians call Mama Coca has been one of the secrets of his political success. "The sacred coca leaf meant that we poor people are in government today," he proclaims.

Morales' stand was backed up here earlier this month when Jean Ziegler, the influential former Swiss parliamentarian, now the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, announced that promoting the cultivation and consumption of coca "doesn't go against international treaties to fight drug trafficking and organised crime."

But the determination of Morales, the leader of a poor country of nine million people, is only a tiny part of Latin America's rejection of the "war on drugs". In a Venezuela enriched by high prices for its oil exports, President Hugo Chavez, himself a political and financial supporter of Morales and ally of Fidel Castro, is placing strict controls on his country's co-operation with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The democratically elected Chavez sees the DEA as an arm of a government which was involved with the right-wing coup d'état in 2002, which toppled him briefly.

He sees it as devoted as much to Washington's political and military strategies in Latin America as to the battle against narcotics. The plain-speaking Chavez, who has called President Bush "a devil", has accused the DEA of spying.

Pedro Carreno, Chavez's justice minister, has said that Venezuela would not allow the DEA to mount anti-drug operations on its territory. Chavez has also forbidden overflights by US government aircraft. Carreno suggested that instead of Plan Colombia, the US "should apply a Plan Washington, New York, or Miami, so that they fly over their own air space, and take care of their coast and border because 85 per cent of the drugs that are produced in Latin America go to the United States."

Now a third Latin American leader, the newly elected President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, has announced that his country will ignore US instructions in the "war on drugs". He has announced that he will no longer allow US forces to occupy a large base at the Pacific port of Manta, which was leased to them by a previous government and which the Pentagon says is used for aircraft monitoring cocaine shipments between Peru and Colombia. Many small farmers in Ecuador along the border with Colombia have seen their crops and livestock ruined and their own health affected by the spraying of poisons, such as glyphosate, by Colombian and US pilots in a so far vain attempt to destroy coca bushes in Colombia. The pesticides have drifted over the international border spraying Ecuadorean farms.

Last week, Professor Paul Hunt of Essex University, the UN Special Rapporteur on Health, speaking in Ecuador said: "There is credible, reliable evidence that the aerial spraying of glyphosate along the Colombia-Ecuador border damages the health of people living in Ecuador. There is also reliable evidence that the aerial spraying damages their mental health. Military helicopters sometimes accompany the aerial spraying and the entire experience can be terrifying, especially for children. "

If this continues the Ecuadoreans have threatened to shoot the offending aircraft down.

But it is in the Colombian capital city, Bogota, that the "war on drugs" is seriously falling apart. Colombia's president, Alvaro Uribe, is in deep political trouble as his opponents dig up unsavoury evidence of his past. He was for years seen as the strongest ally of the US and Britain in South America - he has been received several times at the White House and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office paid him a substantial bursary in 1998 for two years' study at St Antony's College, Oxford before he was elected president in 2002. As a model recruit into the "war on drugs" his country has received $5.4bn under the so-called Plan Colombia from Washington for drug control, more US foreign aid than any other country except Israel and Egypt.

Yet Colombia is estimated to be producing nearly 800 tons of cocaine every year and it has been an open secret for years that senior politicians and the armed forces are deeply mixed up in drug dealing and the right-wing death squads - coyly referred to as "paramilitaries" are also involved in the trade.

In February, Uribe had to sack his foreign minister Maria Consuelo Araujo because of her family connections with the death squads and the drug trade. Uribe is becoming something of a pariah and his support is falling away, even in Washington. Senator Al Gore withdrew from a conference on climate change in Latin America to avoid being photographed with him because of allegations linking Uribe and government members to death squads and drug dealing. Gore called the claims deeply troubling. In 2001, some senior politicians signed the so-called Pact of Ralito, which bound them to well-known drug smugglers with names such as Jorge 40, Don Berna, Salvatore Mancuso and Diego Vecino. Other accusations against Uribe include one by an opposition senator that death squads used farms belonging to Uribe's family to carry out meetings and killings in the 1990s.

Earlier this month, the Vice President, Francisco Santos announced that "more than 40 members of congress" could go to prison because of their links to drugs and death squads. More than a dozen senators, congressmen and political insiders have been arrested. This month, two police generals were sacked.

The truth is also emerging about the Colombian army, beloved of the US government but widely hated by many Colombians for its closeness to the death squads. Senator Patrick Leahy ordered a temporary freeze on tens of millions of dollars of US military aid after the Colombian army commander, General Mario Montoya, was found to be deeply involved with the death squads.

Leahy condemned the waste of US money in Colombia: "When Plan Colombia began, we were told it would cut by half the amount of cocaine in five years. Six years and $5bn later, it has not had any measurable effect on the amount of cocaine entering our country."

Big business is also caught up in drug dealing. In March, Chiquita Brands International, a US banana multinational, was fined $25m by the US Justice Department for having funded the AUC, the principal Colombian death squad which is closely linked to international drug-smuggling. The collapse of the "war on drugs" in Latin America is of a piece with Tony Blair's failure to control drugs in the UK by police action and imprisonment. Britain's drug use rates are among the highest in Europe and there are 327,000 problem drug users. The failure to stem the supply of heroin is illustrated by the fall in price of a gram, from £70 in 2000 to £54 in 2005. The annual number of drug offenders jailed more than doubled between 1994 and 2005 and the average length of their sentences went up. The courts handed out nearly three times as much prison time in 2004 as they did 10 years earlier.

Last month, an inquiry for the UK Drug Policy Commission said: "The research suggests that the greatest reductions in drug-related harm have come from investment in treatment and harm reduction. However, the bulk of expenditure on drug policy in the UK is still devoted to the enforcement of drug laws".

In Britain, as in Latin America, drugs clearly can't be controlled by armies and police forces.

Hugh O'Shaughnessy is the author with Sue Branford of 'Chemical Warfare in Colombia: the Costs of Coca Fumigation'